Heughs Land, LLC v. City of Holladay : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Heughs Land, LLC v. City of Holladay : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Anthony L. Rampton; Angela E. Atkin; Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDonough PC; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Peter Stirba, Gary R. Guelker; Stirba and Associates; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Heughs Land v. City of Holladay, No. 20040611 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5124
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




CITY OF HOLLADAY, a municipal 
corporation and local subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040611-C A 
District Court Case No. 030919270 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Peter Stirba 
Gary R. Guelker 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suit 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2681) 
Angela E. Atkin (USB #9328) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
UTAHCOUfSTQ** 
UTAH 







IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




CITY OF HOLLADAY, a municipal 
corporation and local subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040611-CA 
District Court Case No. 030919270 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Peter Stirba 
Gary R. Guelker 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suit 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
Anthony L. Rampton (USB #2681) 
Angela E. Atkin (USB #9328) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
o'vxr : 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. SELF-EXECUTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAY NOT BE 
LIMITED OR IN ANY WAY RESTRICTED BY LEGISLATION 1 
A. The City of Holladay does not Contest that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution is Self-Executing 1 
B. A Self-Executing Clause is not Subject to Limiting or Contravening Legislation 
such as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 2 
II. A DECISION WHICH PRECLUDES STATE COURT AS A PROPER 
VENUE FOR LITIGATING FEDERAL TAKINGS CLAIMS 
CONCURRENTLY WITH STATE TAKINGS CLAIMS IS IN DIRECT 
CONTRAVENTION OF THE POLICY SET FORTH IN WILLIAMSON 7 
CONCLUSION 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page No. 
CASES 
Bateman v. City of West Bountilful, 
89 F.3d 704 (10th Cir. 1996) 4 
Bott v. DeLand, 
922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996) 3 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd. 
795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) 2, 3, 4, 6 
Dishmanv. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 
482 N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 1992) 5 
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 
803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990) 2,4 
Felder v. Casey, 
487 U.S. 131 (1988) 5 
Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 
953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992) 8 
Greenway Dev. Co., Inc. v. Borough ofParamus, 
750 A.2d 764 (N.J. 2000) 4, 5 
Lynch v. Jacobsen, 
184 P. 929 (Utah 1919) 3 
Moore Real Estate, Inc. v. Porter County Drainage Bd. of Porter County, 
578 N.E.2d 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 5 
Nielson v. Gurley, 
888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 6, 7 
Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n. v. City of San Marcos, 
989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1993) 8 
Patterson v. American Fork City, 
67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003) 7 
679107 2 ii 
Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 
878 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1989) 8 
Rainey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis and Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 
967 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1997) 8 
Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist., 
16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000) 2 
Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 
142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998) 8 
Williamson County Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985) 1, 7, 8, 9 
Wolff v. Sec'y of the South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks Dept, 
544 N.W.2d 531 (S. D. 1996) 5 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
16 AM.JUR. 2v Constitutional Law § 101 (2004) 3 
iii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court ruled, and the City of Holladay argues here, that the notice 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act bar Heughs Land's state takings 
claims, and that Heughs Land's federal takings claims are not ripe until the state claims 
are fully adjudicated. 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is undisputedly self-executing. It is 
this self-executing characteristic that vests citizens with immediate Judicially enforceable 
rights arising from the taking of their private property and exempts the constitutional 
provision from any legislation except for that which broadens the rights created 
thereunder. The result sought by the City of Holladay would be the unconstitutional, 
legislative narrowing of a self-executing constitutional right. 
In Williamson County Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court 
held that "federal takings claims are not ripe for litigation until the claimant has sought 
compensation from the state and been denied." 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). Many courts 
refuse to interpret Williamson as precluding state courts as an initial and concurrent 
venue for federal takings claims. Heughs Land asks this Court to do the same. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SELF-EXECUTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAY NOT BE 
LIMITED OR IN ANY WAY RESTRICTED BY LEGISLATION, 
A, The City of Holladay does not Contest that Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution is Self-Executing, 
The City of Holladay presents not one case opposing the self-executing nature of 
article I. section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
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It is this self-executing nature that prevents the rights arising under article I, 
section 22 from being limited or in any way restricted by legislation such as the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Though there was a brief time when Utah jurisprudence 
was ambivalent as to the nature of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, modern 
courts have made it unequivocally clear that this constitutional clause is self-executing. 
See. e.g., Column v. Utah State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 630 (Utah 1990) ("We now 
reaffirm that article I, section 22 is self-executing."); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 n.l (Utah 1990) ("Recently, in Column v. Utah State 
Land Bd. (citation omitted), we held that article I, section 22 was self-executing."); 
Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533, 535 (Utah 
2000) (uTo date, this court has expressly found three constitutional provisions to be self-
executing: (1). . . article XII, section 18, providing for the liability of bank stockholders 
(citation omitted), (2) article I, section 22, the Takings Clause (citing Colman)\ and (3) 
article I, section 9, the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
(citation omitted)."). 
B. A Self-Executing Clause is not Subject to Limiting or Contravening 
Legislation such as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Unlike certain other rights that are born of statute, the rights deriving from a self-
executing constitutional clause are effective and enforceable as is. In other words, "a 
self-executing clause is one that can be judicially enforced without implementing 
legislation," Spackman at 535. Thus, in the case at hand, subject matter jurisdiction over 
Heughs Land's state takings claims is presumed to exist. 
A - U 1 0 7 "» 2 
In Lynch v. Jacobsen. 184 P. 929, 933 (Utah 1919), the Court stated that "[i]t is all 
too well settled to admit of controversy, although not always kept in mind by either 
courts or counsel that where certain rights are granted or certain liabilities are imposed 
by the Constitution, all that is intended thereby, unless otherwise expressed in the 
instrument itself, is that the Legislature is bound by the constitutional provision as 
written ... such Constitutions are merely limitations upon the powers of the state 
Legislatures." (emphasis added). 
The obvious intent of a strict limitation on legislative power is to guarantee the 
availability of certain, unimpeded constitutional rights. It follows that any legislation 
aimed at self-executing constitutional rights can only further the exercise of such a 
constitutional right and make it more available. See Colman at 630 ("[T]he delegates [to 
the Constitutional Convention in 1895] assumed that article I, section 22 would be a 
limitation on the state and that further legislation would provide no less protection than 
that mandated by article 1, section 22." (emphasis added); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 
738 (Utah 1996) (Courts may avoid legislation incongruous to self-executing 
constitutional provisions); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 101 (2004) ("It is clear 
that legislation which would defeat or restrict a self-executing mandate of the constitution 
is beyond the power of the legislature."). 
Based on these principles, the City of Holladay's argument that the legislative 
restrictions in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act apply to article I, section 22 must 
fail 
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First, the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are, 
by definition, "limiting" vis a vis the Takings Clause. Colman at 630 ("The issue is 
whether an inverse condemnation claim under article I, section 22 is subject to the 
limitations found in the Governmental Immunity Act.") (emphasis added); Farmers New 
World at 1244 n.l ("An inverse condemnation claim under that constitutional provision 
[article I, section 22] is self-executing and not subject to the limitations found in the 
Governmental Immunity Act.") (emphasis added). As discussed above, self-executing 
constitutional provisions may be broadened but not limited in any way by legislation. 
Second, Utah courts have already determined that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act does not apply to article I, section 22 takings claims. See Colman. See 
also Farmers New World at 1244 n.l ("An inverse condemnation claim under [article I, 
section 22] is self-executing and not subject to the limitations found in the Governmental 
Immunity Act); Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("[A]rticle I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing . . . [T]he Utah 
Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, section 22 of the state constitution as allowing a 
suit for inverse condemnation when the effect of an ordinance is to take or damage 
private property at a level that gives rise to a constitutional claim."). 
Numerous other jurisdictions specifically agree that state notice-of-claim statutes 
cannot be applied to constitutionally-derived rights. Greenway Dev. Co., Inc. v. Borough 
ofParamus, 750 A.2d 764, 770 (N.J. 2000) ("We are also persuaded that the notice 
provision of the TCA does not apply to inverse condemnation claims . . .That 
constitutional provision against unconstitutional takings is self-executing, in the sense 
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that such claims arise independently of the TCA. Additionally, 'statutes [cannot] 
abrogate constitutional rights.'(citation omitted)"); Moore Real Estate, Inc. v. Porter 
County Drainage Bd. of Porter County, 578 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ([0]ur 
constitution in Article 1, Section 21 requires that no person's property shall be taken by 
law without just compensation. The Board may not use [the notice provisions of] a state 
statute, the tort claims act, to trump the constitutional rights of Moore."); Wolff v. Sec'y of 
the South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks DepL, 544 N.W.2d 531, 535 (S.D. 1996) 
("Because the claim [for inverse condemnation] proceeds from a [state] constitutional 
r ight . . . no notice of injury was required to bring the cause of action against the 
Secretary."); Dishman v. Nebraska Public Power Dist, 482 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Neb. 
1992) (Court refused to apply notice requirement of tort claims act to an action for 
inverse condemnation because the state constitutional provision which prohibits the 
taking of property without just compensation is self-executing). 
Finally, the City of Holladay's claim that self-executing clauses are subject to 
"procedural" legislation is unsupportable. The law simply does not make a "substantive" 
versus "procedural" distinction with regard to the legislature's ability to regulate self-
executing rights; rather, the law only makes a "limiting" versus "broadening" distinction. 
1
 In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988), the Supreme Court held that "a state court 
may not decline to hear an otherwise properly presented federal claim because that claim 
would be barred under a [Wisconsin] state law requiring timely filing of notice. State 
courts simply are not free to vindicate the substantive interests underlying a state rule of 
decision at the expense of the federal right." Several state courts have applied the 
reasoning in Felder to render state notice-of-claim laws inapplicable in actions alleging 
violations of federal as well as state constitutional rights, such as inverse condemnation. 
See. e.g., Greenway Dev. at 770. 
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In other words, legislatures may broaden self-executing constitutional rights (either 
substantively or procedurally), but may not in any way, even procedurally, limit those 
rights. If subject matter jurisdiction of takings claims is conditioned upon compliance 
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's notice-of-claim provisions, the legislation 
would unconstitutionally limit a litigant's takings rights in a way that did not exist prior 
to enactment of the statute in 1978. 
The City of Holladay argues that courts require "strict compliance" with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirements. That may be true, but certainly 
"strict compliance" can be required only where the underlying claim is subject to the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act in the first place. Heughs Land's very contention, 
which is supported by Column, is that its constitutionally-based takings claims are 
exempt from the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The City of Holladay holds out Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) in support of the City's distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" 
immunity, claiming that "procedural" limitations on takings claims are permissible. The 
case is inapposite for two reasons. First and most importantly, Nielson does not involve 
article I, section 22 or any other self-executing constitutional provision. Because the law 
is unique with regard to self-executing provisions, Nielson has no application to the facts 
at hand. Second, the "substantive" and "procedural" distinction made in Nielson was 
made within the context of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, i.e. the Act did apply. 
The plaintiff in Nielson brought claims against a State employee. In attempt to avoid the 
"procedural" notice-of-claim statute, the plaintiff claimed to sue the State employee in his 
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individual capacity and not his capacity as a government employee. The court found that 
the plaintiff was, in fact, basing his claims on conduct the employee engaged in while 
performing his duties as a State employee. The court ultimately held that because the 
ability of the plaintiff in Nielson to bring the claim at all was created by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign or "substantive" immunity, the 
legislature could clearly create and enforce any corresponding "procedural" notice-of-
claim requirements. In contrast, Heughs Land's takings claim is brought under the article 
I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, and the legislature is constitutionally prohibited 
from restricting or limiting self-executing rights. 
II. A DECISION WHICH PRECLUDES STATE COURT AS A PROPER 
VENUE FOR LITIGATING FEDERAL TAKINGS CLAIMS 
CONCURRENTLY WITH STATE TAKINGS CLAIMS IS IN DIRECT 
CONTRAVENTION OF THE POLICY SET FORTH IN WILLIAMSON. 
This Court must decide how to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Williamson 
County Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank when a plaintiff concurrently raises both 
state and federal takings claims in state court.2 
In Williamson, the Supreme Court dismissed the respondent's claims as premature 
for two reasons. First, the majority of the Court's ripeness analysis focused on the 
absence of a final decision regarding the development of respondent's property. The 
Court held that Williamson County Regional Planning Commission's 1981 disapproval 
:
 The Utah Supreme Court applied Williamson in Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 
P.3d 466 (Utah 2003), but to a distinctly different set of facts than exist in the case at 
hand. In Patterson, the plaintiff raised federal takings in state court, but raised no 
concurrent state takings claims. Because of the plaintiffs failure to avail itself of state 
inverse condemnation remedies, the Court could not hear the federal claims. In contrast, 
Heughs Land has raised both state and federal takings claims in state court. 
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of the respondent's plat did not constitute a final, reviewable decision given the 
availability of a variance procedure that was not pursued by respondent. Second, 
respondent raised only federal takings claims and failed to invoke available state inverse 
condemnation remedies. 
Because a final administrative decision had not been rendered, and in order to 
promote the efficient use of judicial resources, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as 
unripe. In doing so, the Supreme Court did not terminate the federal takings rights 
guaranteed by the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.3 Instead, the Court 
indicated that for purposes of judicial economy, takings claims should preferably be 
resolved on the merits in state court. 
Following Williamson, numerous courts have embraced state courts as the sole, 
proper venue for litigating both state and federal takings claims. See, e.g., Peduto v. City 
of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1989); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. 
City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1993); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of 
County Comm 'rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10n Cir. 1998); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport 
Autk, 953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992); Rainey Bros. Constr. County v. Memphis and 
Shelby Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1997). These decisions 
reason that even if a litigant cannot, under Williamson, assert federal takings claims in 
federal court, that does not mean that a litigant could not assert those claims in state 
court. 
5
 This is the result under a literal interpretation of Williamson, whereby a plaintiff is 
precluded under the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel from litigating 
federal takings claims in federal court after litigating state takings claims in state court. 
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The City of Holladay argues that jurisdiction over federal takings claims exists 
only in federal court and must be preceded by a fully adjudicated state claim involving 
the same operative facts. In theory, this either eliminates federal takings rights altogether 
or results in two trials of the same case, which flies in the face of Williamson. 
CONCLUSION. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court for two reasons. First, 
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing. Therefore, any right to 
recover under that constitutional provision may not be modified or restricted in any way 
by legislation such as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Second, the ripeness 
doctrine set forth in Williamson only restricts the ability of a federal court to hear state 
takings claims before state remedies have been exhausted. Williamson does not preclude 
simultaneous determination by a state court of both state and federal claims. The 
judgment of the district court should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the 
district court for trial of both state and federal takings claims. 
Anthony I^Rampton 
Angel^E. Atkin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Heughs Land, LLC 
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